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Information Privacy and Corporate Power: Towards a
Re-Imagination of Information Privacy Law
Marcy E. Peek ∗
This Article contends that that there is a fundamental dynamic involved
in the information privacy landscape that has heretofore remained largely unexamined and has resulted in intractable problems in information privacy law
and jurisprudence–namely, corporate power. More specifically, this Article argues that information privacy is governed not just by governmental law but
also by corporations via private governance. Part I of this Article briefly canvasses the current state of information privacy law and jurisprudence. Part II
argues that domestic and international legal regimes are governed not only by
governments but also by private actors, including corporations. Part III presents three examples of corporations engaging in private governance of information privacy. Part IV addresses some of the implications of the private governance model as applied to information privacy law.
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“[T]hat which goes unrecognized is difficult to regulate.”

1

INTRODUCTION
Information privacy laws and jurisprudence are at an impasse.
For the most part, scholars are engaged in well-meaning but intracta2
ble debates. The majority of the information privacy scholarship focuses on one of the following projects: defining or describing pri3
4
vacy; finding adequate metaphors for privacy; locating, defending,
or critiquing privacy law (beginning with Warren and Brandeis’s
5
seminal article published in 1890, the Right to Privacy); locating par6
ticular privacy wrongs; or balancing privacy interests with other in7
terests such as national security. In addition, in response to the
many problems of information privacy—problems such as computer
8
9
profiling, personal data collection and sharing by companies, iden-

1
A. Claire Cutler, Private International Regimes and Interfirm Cooperation, in THE
EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 23, 24 (Rodney Bruce Hall
& Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002).
2

Given the political history of the privacy debate in this country, no
significant shift in U.S. policy seems likely to occur until some crisis or
highly publicized event forces us to look at the issue from a new perspective. Indeed, in the current political climate, efforts to press a
fundamental shift in policy appear to be losing momentum. . . . Without a sense of urgency, special interest politics and a general antiregulatory sentiment will likely dominate political discourse in the
United States on this issue for the foreseeable future.
James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1,
90–91 (2003).
3
See generally, ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the
Box: Considering Transparency, Anonymity, and Pseudonymity as Overall Solutions to the
Problems of Information Privacy in the Internet Society, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 991 (2004).
4
See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001).
5
See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
6
See generally, Joel Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS
L.J. 877 (2003).
7
See generally, Sadiq Reza, Privacy and the Post-September 11 Immigration Detainees:
The Wrong Way to a Right (and Other Wrongs), 34 CONN. L. REV. 1169 (2002).
8
See generally, Comment, Janet Dean Gertz, The Purloined Personality: Consumer
Profiling in Financial Services, 39 San Diego L. Rev. 943 (2002).
9
See, e.g., DANIEL SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION
PRIVACY LAW 623–35 (2006).
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10

tity theft, and problems of non-secure computer databases contain11
ing personal information —privacy scholars have put forth a variety
of possible solutions. Some of these solutions are based in traditional
12
13
14
bodies of law such as tort law, contract law, and property law.
Other solutions call for statutory reform in matters pertaining to data
15
collection, sharing, and use. But the answers to the problems in information privacy have remained elusive.
This Article contends that that there is a fundamental dynamic
involved in the information privacy landscape that has heretofore
remained largely unexamined and has resulted in intractable problems in information privacy—namely, corporate power. More specifically, this Article argues that information privacy is governed not
just by governmental law but also by corporations via private governance. Unless corporate power vis-à-vis the individual and the governance of information privacy law by corporations is addressed, the law
will continue to strengthen corporate power and erode privacy in the
guise of privacy-enhancing efforts. Scholars must delve beneath the
façade of privacy laws and Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) enforcement actions in order to expose the power dynamics that pervade information privacy law and policy.
Hans Morgenthau famously argued in a seminal work examining
16
power that “the element of power as the immediate goal of the policy pursued is explained and justified in ethical, legal, or biological
terms. That is to say: the true nature of the policy is concealed by
17
ideological justifications and rationalizations.” In regard to privacy,
I similarly argue that the stated reasons and purposes of information
10
See generally, Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft
Problem, 80 TEX. L. REV. 89 (2001).
11
See generally, Nina Bernstein, Electronic Eyes: What the Computer Knows, N.Y.
Times, A1, Sept. 15, 1997, 1997 WLNR 4871741.
12
See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1283 (2000) (arguing against treating personal information as property and
suggesting a “breach of trust” cause of action based in tort law).
13
See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1193 (1998) (arguing for contractual default rules in favor of individuals).
14
See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84
GEO. L.J. 2381 (1996). But see Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1125 (2000) (arguing that privacy cannot be properly protected by
property rights).
15
DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 101 (2004).
16
HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND
PEACE (5th ed. 1973).
17
Id. at 88.
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privacy law conceal the true nature and driving forces of information
18
privacy law. Moreover, the privacy debate and scholarship is at an
impasse because the underlying force that is at the center of privacy
law is also the white elephant in information privacy law: the domi19
nance of corporate power and corporate governance of information
privacy law.
20
A few definitional understandings are in order. When I speak
21
of privacy and corporate power, I speak not of surveillance, but
22
rather of domination over the individual.
Furthermore, when I
speak of privacy, I refer to information privacy—primarily in regard
23
to federal statutory law and enforcement—rather than decisional
24
25
privacy (such as the right to abortion) or other types of privacy. In

18

See infra Part III.
When I use the term “corporate governance” in this Article, I use it as shorthand for “governance of others by corporations.” In other words, as used in this Article, corporate governance should not be confused with the traditional understanding of corporate governance, i.e., a corporation’s internal governance of itself.
20
This is particularly necessary because “[t]oday, we have hundreds of laws pertaining to privacy—the common law torts, criminal law, evidentiary privileges, constitutional law, at least twenty federal statutes, and numerous statutes in each of the fifty
states.” Daniel Solove, The Origins and Growth of Information Privacy Law, 828 PLI/PAT
23, 27 (2005).
21
Surveillance can be thought of as “the cloak-and-dagger stuff of hidden microphones” or alternatively as “the increasingly routine use of personal data and systematic information in the administration of institutions, agencies, and businesses.”
JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR 2 (2001).
22
See generally, Solove, supra note 4.
23
Most notably, this Article’s scope does not include the constitutional right to
information privacy. One commentator explains the distinction between constitutional decisional privacy and constitutional information privacy thusly:
Four years after Roe v. Wade, in 1977, the Court held in Whalen v. Roe
that the constitutionally protected ‘zone of privacy’ extends to two distinct types of interests: (1) ‘independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions’; and (2) the ‘individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.’ The former interest describes Griswold
and Roe; the latter interest was one that the Court had not yet defined.
This latter interest has been called the ‘constitutional right to information privacy.’
Solove, supra note 20, at 47.
24
The decisional/informational binary has been criticized by some scholars or
acknowledged by others as a binary with overlapping areas:
Information privacy concerns the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information. Information privacy is often contrasted with “decisional privacy,” which concerns the freedom to make decisions about
one’s body and family . . . . But information privacy increasingly incorporates elements of decisional privacy as the use of data both expands
and limits individual autonomy.
DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 1 (2003).
19
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addition, this project primarily focuses on information privacy relations between corporations and individuals. A larger project—which
is beyond the scope of this Article—would focus more closely on the
tripartite relationship between corporations, individuals, and the
26
government in regard to information privacy.
Part I of this Article will briefly canvass the current state of information privacy law and jurisprudence. Part II argues that domestic and international legal regimes are governed not only by governments but also by private actors, including corporations. Part III
presents three examples of corporations engaging in private governance of information privacy. Part IV addresses some of the implications of the private governance model as applied to information privacy law.
PART I
THE CURRENT STATE OF INFORMATION PRIVACY
Before embarking on the fundamental argument regarding corporate power’s influence on the lack of consumer privacy, it is first
necessary to briefly describe the current landscape of information
privacy law and scholarship.
A. Definitional Debates
Privacy scholars have devoted much energy to defining the con27
cept of privacy. This definitional project has resulted in a wide array
of notions of what privacy means. For example, privacy has been
28
29
variously understood to mean transparency, anonymity, the right
30
to control one’s personal information, and the right to be let
31
Some privacy scholars understand information privacy to
alone.

25

See generally Anita L. Allen-Castellitto, Understanding Privacy: The Basics, 865
PLI/PAT 23, 28 (2006) (stating that “[t]here are at least four basic types of privacy.
They are (1) informational privacy; (2) physical privacy; (3) decisional privacy; and
proprietary.”).
26
See generally ROBERT O’ HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE (2004) (examining this
tripartite relationship).
27
“Privacy as a concept involves what privacy entails and how it is to be valued.
Privacy as a right involves the extent to which privacy is (and should be) legally protected.” SOLOVE ET AL., supra note 9, at 39.
28
See generally DENNIS BAILEY, THE OPEN SOCIETY PARADOX: WHY THE 21ST CENTURY
CALLS FOR MORE OPENNESS—NOT LESS (2004).
29
WESTIN, supra note 3, at 31–32.
30
See Anita Allen, Origins and Growth of U.S. Privacy Law, 701 PLI/PAT 83, 89
(2002).
31
See generally, Warren & Brandeis, supra note 5.
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32

mean secrecy. The secrecy paradigm posits that “privacy is invaded
by uncovering one’s hidden world, by surveillance, and by the disclo33
Similarly, “the invasion concepsure of concealed information.”
tion” understands privacy as “violated by the invasive actions of par34
ticular wrongdoers who cause direct injury to victims.”
Other
paradigms of privacy include surveillance, intrusion, solitude, mental
35
distance, and limited access to the self. For example, Charles Fried
argues that, “[p]rivacy is not simply an absence of information about
us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over informa36
tion about ourselves.” Ruth Gavison describes privacy as “concern
37
for limited accessibility,” while Jeffrey Rosen maintains that
“[p]rivacy protects us from being misdefined and judged out of context in a world of short attention spans, a world in which information
38
can easily be confused with knowledge.” As one commentator explains, “[t]raditionally, privacy violations have been understood in a
particular manner . . . . The dominant metaphor for modern invasions of privacy is Big Brother, the ruthless totalitarian government in
39
George Orwell’s novel 1984.” Such understandings of privacy generally explore how the individual does, or should, construct his or her
privacy, or lack thereof.
Other scholars’ understandings of privacy incorporate broader
concepts such as human dignity, self-development, and democracy.
For example, Julie E. Cohen argues that “[t]he condition of noprivacy threatens not only to chill the expression of eccentric individuality, but also, gradually, to dampen the force of our aspirations
40
to it.” And Paul M. Schwartz contends that “[t]he maintenance of a
democratic order requires both deliberative democracy and an individual capacity for self-determination . . . . [T]he emerging pattern

32
Of course, some scholars critique the notion of privacy altogether, arguing that
“the best way to curtail the need for governmental control and intrusion is to have somewhat less
privacy.” AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 213 (1999). Other critics argue that
privacy is not a distinct concept at all. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 Georgetown L. J. 1087 134-35 (2006).
33
SOLOVE, supra note 15, at 8.
34
Id.
35
See generally, WESTIN, supra note 3.
36
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968).
37
Gavison, supra note 3, at 423.
38
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA
8 (2000).
39
SOLOVE, supra note 15, at 7.
40
Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426 (2000).
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of information use in cyberspace poses a risk to these two essential
41
values.”
B. Proposed Solutions
Scholars approach the problem of information privacy law from
a variety of approaches and with a myriad of doctrinal tools. For example, some scholars call for treating personal information as prop42
erty. Others argue that violations of personal information should
43
be treated as tortious acts. Still others maintain that information
privacy should be subsumed within the rubric of contract law; that is,
consumers should have the ability to contract with companies for the
44
use, sharing, or collection of their information.
On the statutory side, some commentators call for a privacy regime that covers the entire field, rather than the current sectoral ap45
proach to privacy. Such a regime would emulate the European Un46
ion’s comprehensive approach to informational privacy and would
47
certainly evoke the Fair Information Practice Standards of 1977.
For example, in arguing for a change in the architecture of privacy,
Daniel Solove responds negatively to those who argue for market48
based solutions to problems of information privacy and argues that
41
Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609,
1658 (1999).
42
See supra note 14.
43
See supra note 12.
44
See supra note 13.
45
See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 15, at 101.
46
See Council Directive 95/46, art. 4, § 1(c), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 39 (EC).
47
Id.
Fair Information Practices were recommended by the Report of the
U.S. Privacy Protection Commission published in 1977. Under various
models of ‘fair information practices,’ standards such as these should
be met to the extent possible: (1) the existence of data systems containing personal information should not be a secret; (2) personal information should only be collected for narrow, specific purposes; (3) personal information should only be used in a ways that are similar to and
consistent with the primary purposes for its collection; (4) personal information should be collected only with . . . informed consent . . . ; (5)
personal information should not be shared with third parties without
notice or consent; (6) . . . the duration of storage of personal information should be limited; and (7) individuals should have access to personal information about themselves and should be permitted to correct
errors; (8) those who collect personal data should insure the security
and integrity of personal data and data systems.”
Allen-Castellitto, supra note 25, at 35–36.
48
See SOLOVE, supra note 15, at 80–87. Solove also argues that “law should hold
that companies collecting and using our personal information stand in a fiduciary
relationship with us.” Id. at 103.
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“law must restructure our relationships with the entities collecting
49
and using our personal information” that cause privacy failures and
50
that information privacy is “a question of social design.” One of his
proposals is to expand the jurisdiction of the FTC and provide the
51
FTC with greater resources. Calls for a change in the architecture
of information privacy appear to represent the coming trajectory of
information privacy scholarship and law.
C. Deficiencies in Federal Information Privacy Law
The FTC and many federal privacy statutes have been criticized
52
as not being effective enough in protecting privacy. These statutes
53
include, inter alia, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Fair Credit Re54
porting Act and its amendment, the Fair and Accurate Credit Trans55
actions Act of 2003, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
56
1991, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
57
1996 (“HIPAA”), and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection
58
Act. Generally, the scholarly discussion proceeds by attacking some
of the flaws in these statutes and then suggesting some relatively mi59
nor patches, such as changing opt-out rights to opt-in rights.
Yet most federal information privacy laws are toothless. For example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act purports to protect individuals by
60
requiring companies to disseminate privacy notices. But as has of49

Id. at 226.
Id.
51
Id. at 108.
52
See, e.g., Paul Lansing & Mark D. Halter, Internet Advertising and Right to Privacy
Issues, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 181, 195 (2003).
53
15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–09 (2000).
54
15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
55
Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003).
56
Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000)). This
Act “permits people to request that telemarketers not call them again. If the telemarketer continues to call, people can sue for damages of up to five hundred dollars
for each call.” Solove, supra note 20, at 61.
57
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
58
15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2000). “HIPAA required the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to draft regulations to protect the privacy of medical records. HHS’s regulations, among other things, require that people authorize all uses
and disclosures of their health information that are not for treatment, payment, or
health care operation (such as for marketing purposes).” Solove, supra note 20, at
62.
59
See generally, Jeffrey M. Lacker, The Economics of Financial Privacy: To Opt out or
Opt in?, ECON. Q. FED. RES. BANK OF RICH., 7–10 (2002), available at
http://privare.fbk.eur.nl/Literature/references/lacker_the%20economics%20of%2
0financial%20privacy_to%20opt%20out%20or%20opt%20in.pdf.
60
15 U.S.C.S. § 1603 (LexisNexis 2006).
50
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ten been noted, these privacy policies in fact serve to inform individuals of what privacy consumers do not have, and are too cumber61
some and legalistic for most people to read. Moreover, they tend to
make the option of opting out such a hassle that most consumers
62
don’t even bother.
Another example of federal privacy laws’ impotence is the Fair
and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003 (“FACTA”), which
added new sections to the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act
63
(“FCRA”).
The FCRA was intended to help consumers fight the
growing crime of identity theft and protect their personal credit in64
These federal statutes purport to give consumers the
formation.
power to find out what is in their credit report and correct erroneous
tradelines. But the reality is that consumers have a notoriously diffi65
cult time when they try to have errors corrected. A large part of the
reason it is so hard for individuals to correct errors is because these
federal credit-reporting statutes are, for the most part, written in favor of the Credit Reporting Agencies (“CRA”). For example, entities
66
can only obtain your credit file for a “permissible purpose.” However, this “permissible purpose” requirement has been stretched to
the point of irrelevancy. The CRAs release credit reports carelessly,
knowing that it will be difficult for any person to bring a successful
67
suit against them, because the liability standard is malice or intent.
Thus, a CRA will only be found liable for sharing credit reports or
failing to correct erroneous information if their actions were malicious or intentional. This standard of proof is much too high for
68
consumers. Negligence is generally what is occurring at the CRAs,
and the standard for liability should be just that—negligence.
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) of 1991 was
intended to protect the privacy interests of telephone users by re69
stricting telemarketers’ ability to place unsolicited calls. But as one
61

See, e.g., Janice A. Alwin, Comment, Privacy Planning: Putting the Privacy Statutes
to Work for You, 14 DEPAUL BUS. L. J. 353, 362 (2002).
62
See infra, Part III.A.
63
15 U.S.C.S. § 1681–1681x (LexisNexis 2006).
64
15 U.S.C.S. § 1681 (LexisNexis 2006).
65
See, e.g., United States Public Interest Research Group, Mistakes Do Happen:
Credit Report Errors Mean Consumers Lose, March 1998, at p. 9, http://uspirg.org/
uspirg.asp?id2=5970 (concluding that there is still tremendous difficulty in clearing
one’s name after mistake or fraud occurs).
66
15 U.S.C.S. § 1681b (LexisNexis 2005).
67
15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (2000).
68
See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for
Individual Rights?, 44 Fed. Comm. L.J. 195, 211-12 (1992).
69
See 47 U.S.C.S. § 227 (LexisNexis 2006).
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scholar has noted, the very purpose of the statute is misguided: “[t]he
TCPA . . . aims at redressing the aggravation of disruptive phone
calls, and it does not govern the collection, use, or sale of personal
70
data.”
The preceding discussion regarding the inadequacy of federal
statutory law is closely connected to a second problem with domestic
information privacy law: the gaping areas of privacy that are left unprotected and unaddressed by current law. In other words, statutory
law “protects” privacy by type, e.g., medical information, video rental
information, financial information, etc. “Despite the growth of the
Information Society, the United States has resisted all calls for omnibus or comprehensive legal rules for fair information practice in the
71
private sector.” As one scholar admonishes, a “strategy of narrowly
targeted sector-specific reforms has been used in U.S. information
72
privacy law for the last two decades with disastrous results . . . .”
These “disastrous results” have been the complete lack of protection
for certain types of activities (rather than types of personal information), such as grocery stores selling their customers’ data to corporate
data aggregators such as Acxiom and ChoicePoint, and allowing such
third party companies to construct disturbingly detailed profiles on
73
millions of (indeed, most) Americans and American households.
Moreover, the Privacy Act of 1974, arguably “the most compre74
hensive U.S. law pertaining to privacy,” applies only to government
actors. Therefore, “private corporations are not bound by the fair information practices, open-access rules, and data-ownership principles
75
embodied in the Act.”
PART II
CORPORATE POWER AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Part II of this Article argues that the scholarly attempts at resolving problems in information privacy law have failed because there is a
fundamental dynamic at work that has gone unrecognized. Information privacy laws actually have the effect of facilitating greater collec70

SOLOVE, supra note 15, at 69.
Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 500 (1995).
72
Jane K. Winn, Contracting Spyware by Contract, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1345, 1346
(2005).
73
See Richard Behar, Never Heard of Acxiom? Chances Are It's Heard Of You,
FORTUNE, Feb. 23, 2004, at 140.
74
John M. Eden, When Big Brother Privatizes: Commercial Surveillance, the Privacy Act
of 1974, and the Future of RFID, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 20, *4 (2005).
75
Id.
71
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tion, sharing, and use of personal information because information
privacy is governed as much by corporate actions and corporate decision-making as by governmental regulation. In other words, information privacy is governed not just by governmental law but also by cor76
porations.
As Daniel Greenwood has observed:
Once corporations are understood as power sources, a part of
our governance system rather than an object of it, then the market
for law appears radically illegitimate, an example of the powerful seizing the power of the state to increase their own power. Rather
than seeing corporations as Tocquevillian intermediate institutions restraining the state, we should see them as state-like themselves, part of the classic liberal nightmare of a state acting in its
77
own interest and not that of its citizens.

The required discussion that has thus far been largely ignored
but is at the heart of information privacy law and policy is this: privacy
laws and enforcement represent a façade of protection for consumers, keeping them complacent in the purported knowledge that
someone is protecting their privacy interests. Information privacy law
and privacy enforcement are primarily deflections from the fact that
individuals’ privacy is a façade because corporate power drives information privacy law.
A. Corporate Power
It is certainly well recognized that corporations exert enormous
78
79
power both domestically and globally. Corporate power has been
80
on the rise since the late nineteenth century, when corporations
76

I understand corporate power by defining power as “possession of control, authority, or influence over others.”
M-W.com dictionary definition, http://
www.m-w.com/dictionary/power (last visited September 25, 2006).
77
Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Markets & Democracy: The Illegitimacy of Corporate Law,
74 UMKC L. REV. 41, 44 (2005) (emphasis added).
78
Robert Dahl, Power as the Control of Behavior, in POWER 37 (Steven Lukes ed.,
1986). “The analysis of power is often concerned . . . with the identification of elites
and leadership, the discovery of the ways in which power is allocated to different
strata, relations among leaders and between leaders and non-leaders, and so forth.”
Id.
79
See generally, TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA 1 (2003) (“[T]he corporation has
become the core institution of the modern world. Designed to see profit and power,
it has pursued both with endless tenacity, steadily bending the framework of law and
even challenging the sovereign status of the state.”).
80
Comment, Katie J. Thoennes, Frankenstein Incorporated: The Rise of Corporate
Power and Personhood in the United States, 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 203, 205 (2005)
(“[C]orporations have come to dominate society and politics at both a national and
state level by securing for themselves rights and privileges that were once reserved
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81

were recognized as legal persons. It has been reported that twentytwo American corporations have a market capitalization greater than
the gross domestic product of twenty-two specified individual na82
Moreover, a recent Business Week poll showed that nearly
tions.
three-quarters of Americans think “[b]usiness has gained too much
83
power over too many aspects of American life.” One commentator
has stated with alarm that “as corporations gain in autonomous institutional power and become more detached from people and place,
84
the human interest and the corporate interest increasingly diverge.”
Indeed, scholars have even gone so far as to attribute godly status to
85
corporations. This corporate power has, more often than not, been
at the expense of individuals. Corporations drive the continual erosion of personal information privacy. It is not just the data aggregators or data brokers driving this erosion; rather, it is the entirety of
corporate America and Fortune 500 companies that view personal information as a commodity and believe that it is their corporate right
86
to exploit and manipulate personal information as they see fit.
Individuals’ personal information is of enormous economic
value to the business world. In fact, personal information fuels the
wheels of commerce. According to one scholar,
Marketers “rent” lists of names and personal information from database companies, which charge a few cents to a dollar for each
name. Over 550 companies compose the personal information
industry, with annual revenues in the billions of dollars. The sale
of mailing lists alone (not including the sales generated by the use
of the lists) generates $3 billion a year. The average consumer is
on around 100 mailing lists and is included in at least 50 databases. An increasing number of companies with databases . . . are

exclusively for the American people.”).
81
Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (wherein the
Court stated that “[t]he Court does not wish to hear argument on the question
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.”).
82
LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY 2 (2001).
83
Business Week/Harris Poll: How Business Rates: By the Numbers, BUS. WK., Sept.
11, 2000, at 144 available at http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_37/
b3698004.htm.
84
DAVID. C. KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD (2001).
85
See generally, Douglas Litowitz, The Corporation as God, 30 J. CORP. L. 501 (2005).
86
See, e.g., Paul Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1609, 1633–34 (1999) (arguing that “personal information in the private sector is often unaccompanied by the presence of basic legal protections. Yet, private enterprises now control more powerful resources of information technology than ever before.”).
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realizing that their databases are becoming one of their most
87
valuable assets . . . .

Because personal information is of such importance to corporations
and because corporations exert so much influence in the realm of information privacy, the problem of the erosion of individual information privacy can be solved only by crippling corporations’ strangle88
hold on our information privacy laws and policies.
It is important to draw a distinction between “corporate power”
and a more general concept of “business power.” As has been well
established in the political, economic, and legal literature, the corporation is a unique historical and sociological beast that is both formally and instrumentally very much different from other business entities, such as partnerships or sole proprietorships. As David C.
Korten describes corporations in his influential work, When Corporations Rule the World:
The publicly-traded, limited liability corporation is capitalism’s institutional form of choice because it allows the virtually unlimited
concentration of power with minimal public accountability or legal liability. Actual shareholders . . . bear no personal liability beyond the value of their investments. Directors and officers are
protected from financial liability from acts of negligence or commission by the corporation’s massive legal resources and company-paid insurance policies. . . . Unlike real people, who are
eventually rendered equal by the grave, corporations are able to
grow and reproduce themselves without limit, “living” and amass89
ing power indefinitely.

In other words, concerns regarding the social ills emanating
from business tend to focus on the limited liability corporation because, “the large, limited-liability, publicly traded . . . corporations
dominate our economy, politics, and culture. The limited-liability
90
corporation dominates our entire society.”
Moreover, as Lawrence Mitchell forcefully argues, corporations’
91
primary purpose is to maximize shareholders’ short-term profits.
87

SOLOVE, supra note 15, at 19.
Indeed, information privacy law and enforcement is merely an exercise in legitimization, i.e., a cover or masquerade for corporate domination of the American
consumer.
89
KORTEN, supra note 84, at 104–05. See generally, Litowitz, supra note 85, at 525
(“The underlying dilemma is that corporations have tremendous economic and political power (not to mention their power to shape public opinion) but they are ruled
by a handful of appointed managers.”).
90
Charlie Cray & Lee Drutman, Corporations and the Public Purpose: Restoring the
Balance, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 305, 306 (2005).
91
MITCHELL, supra note 82, at 4–5.
88
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Thus, corporations’ main purpose conflicts with many values of
community such as environmental protection, wage increases, and
privacy.
The understanding that corporate power is a dominant global
and domestic force is merely a foundational understanding for unearthing the dynamic at the core of the impasse in information privacy law.
B. Governance by Corporations
As critical legal scholars argue, law often serves merely as legitimization or rationalization of the existing structure; in other words,
ostensibly neutral norms and laws deflect attention from hegemonic
92
forces. This argument can also be applied to information privacy
law, inasmuch as most of our U.S. information privacy laws are seemingly neutral but in fact are largely driven by corporate interests—and
thus erode consumer privacy rather than enhance it. In the field of
information privacy and in the law more generally, “[c]orporations
are power centers, loci of value struggles, political fora. They are not
citizens but governance structures and not neutral but deeply influ93
ential—if illegitimate—participants in our political struggles.”
Drawing upon the general concept of corporate power, many
scholars have observed that authority, legal norms, and governance
are not solely the province of government. Specifically, corporations
exert authority via “specific modes through which corporate actors
94
While some commentators decreate and shape legal regimes.”
scribe this dynamic as one in which corporate actors exercise authority or shape legal norms, other forward-looking scholars have gone
further and argue that when corporations shape the content of legal
regimes in a way that resembles government rulemaking and en95
forcement, they are actually engaged in governance. Some of these
scholars refer to the symbiotic relationship between government and
multiple non-governmental actors, such as corporations, as the “new
governance.” Orly Lobel argues that “[t]he new governance model
challenges . . . conventional assumptions . . . [and] broadens the de92
Cf. Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform & Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) (arguing
that the racism inherent in purportedly neutral norms must be exposed).
93
Greenwood, supra note 77, at 43.
94
Dan Danielsen, How Corporations Govern: Taking Corporate Power Seriously in
Transnational Regulation and Governance, 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 411, 412 (2005).
95
Id. “To govern” means “to control the actions or behavior of” or “to exercise a
deciding or determining influence on.” AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY
588 (3d ed. 1993).
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cision-making playing field by involving more actors in the various
stages of the legal process . . . [Thereby, t]he exercise of normative
96
authority is pluralized.” Dan Danielson explains that this governance is engendered by way of various types of corporate behavior:
Sometimes corporations contribute through interpretations of or
reactions to a legal rule scheme. Sometimes they supply rules
where none exist. Sometimes they shape the rule scheme
through direct political or economic pressure on regulators.
Sometimes they shape it by evading the rule scheme and doing
business elsewhere. Sometimes, to satisfy other business purposes, they adopt more stringent practices than the applicable
rules require. Sometimes they act on their own to get a market
97
edge or exploit an opportunity. Sometimes they act in groups to
create a harmonized regulatory environment or to prevent regulation. . . . When corporations create or shape the content, interpretation,
efficacy, or enforcement of legal regimes and, in so doing, produce effects
on social welfare similar to the effects resulting from rulemaking and en98
forcement by governments, corporate actors are engaged in governance.

In other words, when corporations affect the law in ways that
produce effects similar to those that result from governmental law,
corporate private governance is occurring. While it is common to
confuse the term “governance” with “government,” the two terms are
entirely distinct; indeed, the concept of government is but a subset of
the broader concept of governance. “Governance involves interaction between the formal institutions and those in civil society. Governance refers to a process whereby elements in society wield power,
authority and influence and enact policies and decisions concerning
99
public life and social upliftment.”
Of course, the concept of governance by corporations may be
viewed as contrary to democratic principles because generally, “[f]or
100
lawyers, governance is a constitutional issue.”
However, the “le-

96

Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 373 (2004).
97
For example, in some instances, so-called competitors “collude through cartels
or strategic alliances to increase profits by setting market prices above the level of optimal efficiency.” KORTEN, supra note 84, at 82.
98
Danielson, supra note 94, at 412 (emphasis added).
99
The Global Development Research Center, Understanding the Concept of Governance, http://www.gdrc.org/u-gov/governance-understand.html (last visited on Oct.
9, 2006).
100
Christoph Engel, A Constitutional Framework for Private Governance 2 (MPI Collective Goods Preprint No. 2001/4, Mar. 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=269310 (last visited September 3, 2006).
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101

gitimacy” question vis-à-vis private governance is beyond the scope
of this Article. More importantly, “the normative statement that only
duly elected and representative governments ‘ought’ to be capable of
exercising political authority must not be confused with the empirical
fact that corporations ‘are’ increasingly functioning authoritatively in
102
ruling themselves and others.”
The central focus of this Article is that the traditional understanding of governance as emanating solely from the government
must be—and is being—rethought. Indeed, to dichotomously understand corporate acts as “private” and government acts as “pub103
lic” “does not do justice to the dynamic interconnectedness of each
104
move and countermove by state and corporate actors.”
Governments and corporate actors are engaged in an intricate and profoundly symbiotic dance of acting and reacting to the other’s behaviors, decisions, and regulations. The legal “rules” therefore often
reflect a series of decisions and behaviors on the part of private actors
and the government that together form the authoritative norm. As
Paul Schiff Berman has noted, “[l]egal scholars and policymakers
have an unfortunate tendency to assume that legal norms, once es105
Moretablished, simply take effect and constitute a legal regime.”
over, Berman applauds the groundbreaking academics that study actual practices and real-life exercises of authority to determine the true
legal regime. He observes that such scholars:
refuse to focus solely on who has the formal authority to articulate
norms or the coercive power to enforce them. Instead, they aim
to study empirically which statements of authority tend to be

101

Randy Barnett argues that:
[a] lawmaking system is legitimate if there is a prima facie duty to obey
the laws it makes. Neither “consent of the governed” nor “benefits received” justifies obedience. Rather, a prima facie duty of obedience exists either (a) if there is actual unanimous consent to the jurisdiction of
the lawmaker or, in the absence of consent, (b) if laws are made by
procedures which assure that they are not unjust.
Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 111 (2003).
102
CUTLER, supra note 1, at 33.
103
Indeed, in 1969 John Galbraith argued that certain corporations are in fact
public institutions: “By no known definition of private enterprise can these specialized firms or subsidiaries be classified as private corporations.” John Kenneth
Galbraith, The Big Defense Firms Are Really Public Firms and Should Be Nationalized, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Nov. 16, 1969, at 50.
104
Danielson, supra note 94, at 415.
105
Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 498 (2005).
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treated as binding in actual practice and by whom. . . . Accord106
ingly, the nation-state is denied any special status as a law-giver.

Similarly, Claire Cutler chides those who would rather sweep the reality of private governance under a formalistic rug:
[T]he move of private authority to obscurity is at root an ideological move inspired by the “liberal art of separation” that serves
to isolate and insulate increasing aspects of existence from public
scrutiny and review. The formalistic associations of authority with
the state function ideologically by depicting the world not as it is
107
but as it ought to be.

An understanding of corporate behavior that incorporates the
notion that corporations actually shape the legal structure and actually govern alongside local, state, and national governments allows an
understanding of corporate power that is something more than a
vague concept of which everyone is aware but which few can coherently explain. Understanding corporate power as a type of governance in the domestic (and transnational) spheres renders the amorphous concrete. For example, in the regulatory scheme, there may
exist a governmental law alongside corporate behavior regarding that
same law. In reality, the corporate “rules” and behaviors may—and
increasingly do—represent the dominant mode of behavior and the
actual mode of governance in that area. As another example, corporations may choose to act in ways that openly and egregiously violate
the legislative mandate because governmental deterrence is weak and
ineffective. These intentional violations may nevertheless operate as
the “rule” in the respective arena and thus govern the field as au108
Furthermore, corporations may interpret legislation in
thoritative.
a way that favors corporate interests, and the government may acquiesce in this interpretation through silence and inaction. A final example is the profound effect that corporate lobbying has on the ulti109
mate statutory language of privacy statutes and regulatory rules. As
106

Id. at 510.
Cutler, supra note 1, at 24.
108
Anthony J. Fejfar, Corporate Voluntarism: Panacea or Plague? A Question of Horizon,
17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 923 (1992) (“Corporations influence legislation and its enforcement through lobbying and through the failure to abide by enacted laws and
regulations.”).
109
See generally Matt Taibbi, The Secret History of the Most Corrupt Man in Washington,
ROLLING STONE MAG., at 38 (Apr. 4, 2006) (profiling lobbyist Jack Abramoff); Jon
Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003). Internationally, some scholars argue the situation is even worse.
Outside Europe and the U.S., the extent to which states have become
rule-takers rather than rule-makers is greater than most citizens think,
107
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many commentators note, corporations exert tremendous power
through “their political action committees, their lobbyists, [and] their
110
lawyers.”
Conceptualizing governance as a symbiotic relationship between
governmental and non-governmental actors engenders an understanding of the specific nature of corporate power. Susan Sassen argues that the question is whether “the weight of private . . . interests
in [the] specific work of the state become[s] constitutive of that authority and indeed produce[s] a hybrid that is neither fully private
111
Sassen answers her own question in the affirmanor fully public?”
tive. Indeed, this is the fundamental difference between dualism and
unity theories. In a dualistic world, the public and the private are distinct worlds and operate separately in their own spheres. In a unified
world, the public and the private interact organically and the ensuing
legal regime is just that—organic and informed by both spheres.
Scholars in the field of transnational law have explored this
phenomenon under the academic terminology of “transnational gov112
ernance.”
For example, one commentator in the field notes that
“[c]onstitutions were designed to frame states, and to frame the law
within the state. Today, however, it seems that the social engineering
and controls embodied in such instruments have given way to ‘governance’—a loose network of constitutionally invisible, often private,

largely because when governments announce new regulatory laws they
are somewhat embarrassed to disclose that the national legislature
voted for those laws without having any say in shaping them.
JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 3 (2000).
110
NACE, supra note 79, at 12. For example, “[t]hrough trade agreements, corporate libertarians press governments to provide absolute protection for the intellectual
property rights of corporations.” KORTEN, supra note 84, at 81. Another commentator writes:
Lobbying is yet another source of corporate influence on law. Most,
if not all, major corporations employ legislative liaisons assigned to
monitor legislative activities and to coordinate lobbying efforts to assure that the corporate viewpoint is heard. In addition, virtually every
industry has some sort of trade association or manufacturer’s association designed to present the common interests of the otherwise competing firms. Managing the law and the legislative process has become
a tool of competitive strategy.
Daniel T. Ostas, Deconstructing Corporate Social Responsibility: Insights from Legal and Economic Theory, 38 AM. BUS. L. J. 261, 270–71 (2001).
111
Saskia Sassen, The State and Globalization, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE
AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 91 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker
eds., 2002).
112
See, e.g., TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF PRIVATE LAW (Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand &
Gunther Teubner, eds., 2004).
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113

actors.”
International law scholars recognize that multinational
corporations have begun to take over the role of the state in many areas. “As the state was once the exclusive subject of international law,
the corporation, the state’s creation, has now become a primary subject displacing the state’s exclusivity in this sphere just as it has dis114
placed state ownership and regulation in the market.”
Although the concept of corporate and private governance is be115
ing explored widely in the transnational law literature, there is a
116
relative dearth of scholarly work on the topic in the realm of do117
As Paul Berman argues, “because legal scholars are so
mestic law.
focused on the official organs of legal power—nation-state governments—they have been less likely to embrace ideas about norm118
Dan Danielson notes that
development in non-state arenas.”
“scholars have focused little attention on explicating the precise
mechanisms through which corporations contribute to transnational
regulation and governance or the extent to which the social welfare
effects of regulation and policy may be attributable to corporate activ119
ity.”
This Article is an endeavor to bring the concept of corporate
private governance into the domestic sphere and, specifically, into
the informational privacy literature.
PART III
CORPORATIONS’ GOVERNANCE OF INFORMATION PRIVACY
In the area of information privacy, corporations have been given
wide leeway to govern, i.e., to affect domestic information privacy in

113

Andras Sajo, Book Review, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 697, 697 (2005).
Joel R. Paul, Holding Multinational Corporations Responsible Under International
Law, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 285, 290 (2001).
115
See id. at 285–86 (noting that “private individuals and non-governmental organizations acting both internationally and domestically are contributing to the
emergence of new international norms. These new international norms confer
greater rights and obligations on private individuals and firms, shifting the focus of
international law.”).
116
As one scholar argues, “[p]rivate [governance] is not a new phenomenon, but
public interest in it is. This explains why there is no coherent legal framework for
private [governance] yet.” Engel, supra note 100, at 23.
117
But see John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish:
Theory versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 6
(arguing that “understanding the realities of [corporate social responsibility] provides a unique opportunity to test new governance theory against practice”); Lobel,
supra note 96, at 342 (arguing for a shift in legal thought from a regulatory to a new
governance model).
118
Berman, supra note 105, at 490.
119
Danielson, supra note 94, at 411.
114
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ways that produce effects similar to those that result from governmental law.
In Part III, I will present three examples of corporations’ governing the field of information privacy law through corporate action and
symbiotic government action or inaction. The first is an example of
corporations’ interpretation of privacy law; the second example demonstrates corporations’ bypassing of privacy legislation; and the third
example describes corporations’ intentional violation of information
privacy laws. Each of these examples represents more than corporate
action or reaction to governmental law. Instead, these examples
demonstrate the manners by which corporations have engaged in
private governance and shaped the information privacy regime.
I argue that: (1) when corporations’ actions have an effect on
the market that resembles the effect of governmental authority and
(2) that corporate authority goes largely unchallenged and is, in fact,
accepted as the social norm, corporations are engaging in govern120
ance.
To give practical meaning to this definition, it might prove useful to imagine on a broader level what governance means in our everyday life. Governance is not just state, local, and federal governments passing laws or ordinances and then subjecting offenders to
criminal penalties or other sanctions. Governance is the product of
an interlocking web of actors, both governmental and “private,” that
defines how citizens live their lives and the expectations society has
regarding any specific field or topic. Thus, the relevant source of authority is not merely formal law. As Christoph von Engel contends,
“Most private governance is not legal in nature. Rather, it uses social
121
norms or a technical code.” More specifically, Claire Cutler argues
that “the privatization of government activities, the deregulation of
industries and sectors, increased reliance on market mechanisms in
120
Informal private governance is to be distinguished from formal private governance. Thus, for example, the Mafia internal governance operates informally and often via force. See, e.g., Phil Williams, Transnational Organized Crime and the State, in
THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 167 (Rodney Bruce
Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002) (“The power of criminal organizations is a
threat to the state as sovereign entity in that the state claims a monopoly of coercive
power; criminal organizations also exercise such power and use violence to remove
competitors and obstacles to their businesses.”). Formal private governance structures, by contrast, include such bodies as non-governmental organizations and mandatory professional associations such as medical boards. See Rodney Bruce Hall &
Thomas J. Biersteker, The Emergence of Private Authority in the International System, in
THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 13–16 (Rodney Bruce
Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002).
121
See Engel, supra note 100, at 3.
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general, and the delegation of regulatory authority to private business
associations and agencies are expanding the opportunities for the
122
emergence of private and self-regulatory regimes.”
As Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker explain:
A growing number of actors—actors other than the state—appear
to have taken on authoritative roles and functions in the international system. . . . While these new actors are not states, are not
state-based, and do not rely exclusively on the actions or explicit
support of states in the international arena, they often convey
and/or appear to have been accorded some form of legitimate
authority. That is, they perform the role of authorship over some
important issue or domain. They claim to be, perform as, and are
recognized as legitimate by some larger public (that often includes the states themselves) as authors of policies, of practices, of
rules, and of norms. They set agendas, they establish boundaries
or limits for action. . . . In short, they do many of the things traditionally, and exclusively, associated with the state. They act simultaneously both in the domestic and in the international arenas.
What is most significant, however, is that they appear to have been
123
accorded a form of legitimate authority.

As explained in Part II, the modern notion of governance correctly incorporates an understanding that true governance is not
124
comprised solely of monolithic governmental law; rather, governance involves a host of actors that define and shape citizens’ behavior,
their expectations, and their accepted understandings. Our definition of governance should therefore be expanded to include the multiple actors in the domestic and international arena that have become
part of the domestic and international governance regime.
A. Corporate Interpretation of Privacy Legislation: The Gramm-LeachBliley Act
In Part II of this Article, I noted that Danielsen observed that
one of the ways that corporations govern is “through interpretations
125
of or reactions to a legal rule scheme.” In the realm of information
privacy, this is one of the primary ways in which corporations have
managed to govern the field.
One example of this phenomenon is corporations’ interpretation of the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLB Act” or the “Act”),
122

Cutler, supra note 1, at 23.
See Hall & Biersteker, supra note 120, at 4.
124
See Engel, supra note 100, at 2 (arguing to “put an end to the idea that government has a monopoly on governance”).
125
See supra. Part II.B
123
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which, inter alia, purports to protect individuals’ personal data by requiring companies to disseminate privacy notices. In short, the Act:
allows financial institutions with different branches or affiliates
engaging in different services to share the “nonpublic personal
information” among each branch of the company. Affiliates must
inform customers of the information sharing, but people have no
right to stop the companies from sharing it. However, when financial institutions desire to share customer data with third par126
ties, people have a right to opt-out.

Thus, the law purports to legislate the privacy practices of financial
companies.
Many commentators on information privacy criticize the Act,
maintaining that the Act contains so many loopholes as to virtually
127
eviscerate the effectiveness of the law.
Financial institutions are allowed to share customer data with virtually any third-party company
(i.e., non–affiliated companies) as long as they give customers a right
to “opt out” of these sharing practices.
Paul Schwartz and Edward Janger summarize the findings of a
privacy advocacy group regarding the lack of effectiveness of the GLB
Act:
Explanations of how to opt out invariably appear at the end of the
notices. Thus, before they learn how to opt out, consumers must
trudge through up to ten pages of fine print . . . . [M]any passages regarding opt-out . . . are obviously designed to discourage
consumers from exercising their rights under the statute. For example, some financial institutions include an opt-out box only in
a thicket of misleading statements . . . . Other entities attempt to
dissuade consumers by implying that consumers may have already
opted out or that opting out will accomplish little. A final tactic
of the GLB Act privacy notices is to state that consumers who opt128
out may fail to receive “valuable offers.”

In short, financial institutions’ reaction to the GLB Act’s opt-out
requirement has been an industry-wide effort to make the opt-out
right virtually meaningless. Corporations interpret the Act to mean
that as long as they give some sort of opt-out right—however, minimal and toothless—to their customers, they fall within the legal parameters of the Act. Hence began the bombardment of customers
126

Solove, supra note 20, at 63.
See e.g., Edward Janger & Paul Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley-Act, Information
Privacy, and the Limit of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1231 (2002); Mark
Hochhauser, Lost in the Fine Print: Readability of Financial Privacy Notices, July 2001,
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/GLB-Reading.htm.
128
Janger & Schwartz, supra note 127, at 1231 (internal quotations omitted).
127
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with corporate privacy policies containing legalistic terminology,
lengthy explanations of the institution’s privacy practices, and opt-out
provisions that often require the customer to take proactive steps to
write to the company at an obscure snail mail address and specify that
129
she wishes to opt out of data sharing.
In other words, the opt-out right is meaningless in practice; the
right to opt out of the trafficking of one’s personal information is explained in lengthy, legalistic privacy policies that most people throw
away as just more junk mail. If the consumer actually bothers to read
the policy and recognizes it is of some import, she is likely to be unable to decipher what the company’s privacy policies actually are and
exactly how she can opt out of their sharing practices.
American corporations’ interpretation of the GLB Act has had
an effect on the market that resembles the effect of governmental authority. Moreover, the interpretation of the GLB Act by private actors
has gone largely unchallenged—indeed, it is accepted as the social
norm.
This corporate interpretation of the notice requirement of the
GLB Act and its reaction to that requirement has resulted in a governance regime in which consumers’ choice regarding sharing of
their information with non-affiliated companies has become a virtually meaningless concept. Corporations’ interpretation of the Act
and their industry-wide reaction to the Act has resulted in a system in
which financial institutions can share customers’ information without
restraint in the absence of some rare opt out from the rare individual
who has waded through the muddy waters of a corporate privacy policy and reacted in kind. This systematic practice has an effect on the
market similar to the effect of governmental authority; in this arena,
130
corporations “perform the role of authorship” in the area of privacy
practices under the GLB Act. That is, corporations “perform as, and
are recognized as legitimate by some larger public (that often includes the states themselves) as authors of policies, of practices, of
131
rules, and of norms” in the realm of financial institutions’ privacy
practices. In this domain, corporations—not the government—”set
132
agendas [and] establish boundaries or limits for action.”

129
See generally, Annie I. Anton, Julia B. Earp, Davide Bolchini, Qingfeng He, Carlos Jensen & William Stufflebeam, The Lack of Clarity in Financial Privacy Policies and
the Need for Standardization, N.C. STATE U. CSC TECHNICAL REP. #TR-2003-14 (2003),
available at http://www.theprivacyplace.com/papers/glb_secPriv_tr.pdf.
130
Hall & Biersteker, supra note 120, at 4.
131
Id.
132
Id.
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In addition, corporations have, through their interpretation of
the GLB Act, adopted industry-wide practices that not only have become the social norm but have also become socially acceptable. As
Susan Strange argues, to the extent that non-governmental actors
such as corporations and other private companies acquire power and
“to the extent their power is not challenged, they are implicitly le133
gitimized as authoritative.”
But it is not just that corporate power
in this domain has gone unchallenged and is therefore implicitly authoritative; it is also that the privacy patterns and privacy practices of
financial institutions have infiltrated the society’s consciousness in
such a way that these patterns and practices have become expected
and are deemed acceptable. This phenomenon reflects the exercise
of power described by Steven Lukes as the “third dimension of
134
power” by which “potential issues are kept out of politics, whether
through the operation of social forces and institutional practices or
135
through individuals’ decisions.”
This is also an example of what
136
Harvard economist Andrei Shleifer calls “cognitive persuasion”: the
133

Id. at 6 (summarizing Strange’s argument).

134

Luke's framework traces power in three dimensions: decisional power,
agenda power, and manipulative power. The first dimension, decisional power, is the ability to decide the outcome of an issue in conflict.
. . . Luke's second dimension, agenda power, is the ability to determine
what issues will and will not be raised for decision. To the extent that A
has agenda power over B, A can negate B's first dimension power to
make decisions by foreclosing B's decision making opportunities. A
special aspect of these two dimensions of power is that they function in
circumstances of overt conflict.
Unlike decisional and agenda power, third dimension power does
not operate in a climate of conflict, but rather prevents circumstances
of overt conflict from occurring by creating a manipulated consensus.
Manipulative power is the ability to shape the wants and perceptions of
another. This power operates primarily through manipulation of information. Third dimension power is the most effective form of power
because it insidiously gains the support, or at least the neutrality, of
others even to their own detriment. A, by manipulating B's perceptions, can eviscerate any power that B might have to contribute to the
agenda or make decisions.
Moira T. Roberts, Note, Individual Rights and Government Power in Collision, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1023, 1037–38 (1992).
135
JOHN GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE AND REBELLION IN THE
APPALACHIAN VALLEY 12 (1980). “In a nutshell, Luke’s first dimension is simple, traditional authority; the second dimension is the power to put issues on the agenda;
and the third is the power to actually influence or affect public opinion, as the media
so often does.” Saru Jayaraman, Letting the Canary Lead: Power and Participation Among
Latino/a Immigration Workers, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 103, 108 (2001).
136
Craig Lambert, Resisting Temptation: Economics Discovers the Irrational, HARV.
MAG. Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 57 (describing Shleifer’s work).
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process by which the persuader (in this case the financial corporation) convinces people of an idea by triggering associations that are
consistent with our beliefs and that resonate with our pre-existing
ideas. In the case at hand, corporations send detailed “privacy policies” to customers that are in fact anti-privacy policies. Yet the consumer receives a document labeled “Privacy Policy” and, based on rational expectations and ideas about what privacy means (i.e.,
associations), is persuaded that the policy is indeed about the many
ways in which their financial institution vigilantly protects their privacy.
Of course, this private governance could not exist—and might
be proven non-authoritative—without the inaction of the government. Congress could, of course, amend the legislation so that customers must opt in to sharing practices rather than opt out. Congress could also amend the legislation such that clear,
understandable, and easy opt-out provisions are mandatory. But in
the absence of governmental action, corporations’ interpretation and
molding of the Act operate as the dominant governing force: “[t]o
the extent that regulators . . . acquiesce in or do not react to the
standards selected [by corporations], one could reasonably say the . .
137
. rule . . . is established by the decisions of . . . corporate actors.”
B. Corporate Bypassing of Privacy Legislation: The Children’s Online
Privacy and Protection Act
138

The Children’s Online Privacy and Protection Act (“COPPA”
or the “Act”) was passed in 2000 with the purpose of protecting children from the dangers and lures of the Internet by protecting the
personal information of children (those under the age of thirteen)
online. COPPA aims to do this primarily by requiring parental consent before a commercial website or an online service directed at
139
children collects, uses, or discloses personal information on a child.
140
The COPPA Rule, which implements COPPA, also requires that
websites and online services “[e]stablish and maintain reasonable
procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity of

137

Danielsen, supra note 94, at 414.
15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–08 (2000).
139
This includes websites or online services that have knowledge that they collect
personal information from children. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ET AL., HOW TO
COMPLY WITH THE CHILDREN’S ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION RULE 9 (1999), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/coppa.pdf.
140
Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2006).
138
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141

personal information collected from children.”
The Act requires
that websites subject to COPPA post a privacy policy informing parents of their privacy practices and the contact information for each
142
operator of their website.
How have corporations treated the Act?
First, as Susan Crawford has explained, the Act “has not been a
success; many sites have elected simply not to provide interactive services for children under thirteen rather than cope with the exacting
143
oversight and notice requirements of the Act.”
Second, sites that do provide services to children and are clearly
subject to the Act have chosen to either ignore the requirements of
the Act or, in many cases, comply with COPPA’s facile require144
ments—such as posting a boilerplate privacy policy — while ignoring the more burdensome requirements such as the parental consent
145
and notification mechanisms. For example, in a 2002 FTC study on
COPPA compliance, researchers found that only forty-seven percent
of children-directed sites had any parental consent and notification
146
mechanisms in place.
Third, other sites deflect the issue by requiring online users to
simply check a box stating that they are thirteen or older before gain147
ing access to the site.
Fourth, in a similar vein, some corporations simply deflect the issue by stating on their website that they don’t sell products or provide
services to children or that they do not collect information from chil-

141

See 16 C.F.R. § 312.3(e) (2006).
In addition, entities subject to the Act must allow parents to access any personal information on their child and delete it or opt out of future collection, and
such entities must limit their collection of children’s personal information to that
which is reasonably necessary to participate in the activity. Id.
143
Susan P. Crawford, Shortness of Vision: Regulatory Ambition in the Digital Age, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 695, 706 n.45 (2005).
144
As of 2002, ninety percent of child-directed sites posted a privacy policy. Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, Protecting Children’s Privacy Under COPPA: A Survey on Compliance, at 5, Apr. 2002, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/
04/coppasurvey.pdf#search=%22Protecting%20Children's%20Privacy%20Under%2
0COPPA%3A%20A%20Survey%20on%20Compliance%22.
145
Notably, COPPA does not require that privacy policies indicate the methods
that parents can use to obtain notice and provide consent. See id. at 18.
146
See id. at 12.
147
See Complaint at 6, United States v. Xanga.com, No.: 06-CIV-6853 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept.
7,
2006),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623073/
xangacomplaint_image.pdf.
142
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148

dren.
For example, Amazon.com’s privacy policy states that “Amazon.com does not sell products for purchase by children. We sell
children’s products for purchase by adults. If you are under 18, you
may use Amazon.com only with the involvement of a parent or guard149
Similarly, Target’s online privacy policy states that “[w]e do
ian.”
not knowingly collect personally identifiable information from chil150
dren under the age of 13.”
Thus, corporations have responded to the Act by either: (1) not
providing online services to children; (2) providing online services to
children while ignoring the most meaningful yet burdensome
COPPA requirements; (3) obtaining “proof” that a person is at least
thirteen by merely having the person click a box before proceeding
into the site; or (4) simply stating in boilerplate language that they
don’t provide services to children or collect information from children.
By these methods, corporations intentionally bypass the Act.
The first action—actually not providing services to persons under the
age of 13—is a form of benign bypassing. However, the other three
actions represent something more than rogue corporate behavior; all
three examples are a form of corporate governance in the field of information privacy.
As in the case of privacy policies under the GLB Act, corporations’ reaction to COPPA has an effect on the market that resembles
the effect of governmental authority. The manner in which COPPA
actually governs children’s online activity is dictated by corporations.
151
Corporations “perform the role of authorship” by “perform[ing] as,
and . . . [being] recognized as legitimate by some larger public . . . as
152
authors of policies, of practices, of rules, and of norms” in the
realm of online companies’ privacy practices toward children.
Corporations set the governing standards of COPPA by intentionally bypassing COPPA. The Act is treated by corporations as
binding only inasmuch as corporate norms define the actual practices
of governing children’s online privacy. In this domain, corpora148

Joseph Turow, Privacy Policies on Children’s Websites: Do They Play by the Rules?, at
12, March 2001, available at http://www.asc.upenn.edu/usr/jturow/PrivacyReport.pdf#search=%22privacy%20policies%20on%20childrens'%20websites%22.
149
Amazon.com Online Privacy Policy, http://www.amazon.com/exec/
obidos/tg/browse/-/468496/104-9748931-2945530#children (last visited Sept. 11,
2006).
150
Target.com
Online
Privacy
Policy,
http://sites.target.com/site/en/
spot/page.jsp?title=privacy_policy (last visited September 11, 2006).
151
Hall & Biersteker, supra note 120, at 4.
152
Id.
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tions—not the government—have “set agendas [and] establish
153
boundaries or limits for action.” In such cases, corporations should
be “understood as power sources, as part of our governance system
154
rather than objects of it . . . .”
Unlike the GLB Act, COPPA represents a type of legislation that
can be bypassed by mere words rather than conduct. In other words,
COPPA is an Act that can be circumvented merely by, in effect, stating “This law does not apply to us” or “By using this website (or clicking an I Agree button), you affirm that you are not a child and thus
we are legally protected.” The FTC’s own COPPA Rule encourages
this behavior; it states that COPPA “applies to operators of commercial Web sites and online services directed to children under the age
155
For sites such as Amaof 13 that collect personal information.”
zon.com or Google’s Gmail, the FTC created a loophole, stating that
COPPA
applies to general audience Web sites and online services that
have actual knowledge that they are collecting information from
children under the age of 13. The [COPPA] Rule requires that
these Web site operators post privacy policies, provide parental
notice, and get verifiable consent from a parent or guardian before collecting personal information from children.
Although the [COPPA] Rule doesn’t define the term “actual
knowledge,” it indicates that a Web site operator is considered to
have actual knowledge of a user’s age if the site asks for—and receives—information from the user from which age can be determined. For example, actual knowledge of age exists when an operator learns a child’s age by asking for date of birth on a Web
156
site’s registration page.

This “actual knowledge” test is merely a designed loophole. This
loophole is unsurprising given the key role major corporations had in
157
the passage and language of COPPA, which allows most sites to

153

Id.
Greenwood, supra note 77, at 44.
155
Federal Trade Commission, The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule: Not Just
for Kids’ Sites, at 1, February, 2004, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/
pubs/alerts/coppabizalrt.pdf.
156
Id.
157
See, e.g., Consumer Internet Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. &
Transp., 106th Cong., 2000 WL 1534362 (F.D.C.H.) (2000) (testimony of George
Vradenburg, America Online Senior Vice President for Global and Strategic Planning) (stating that “[w]e [at AOL] worked closely with Senator Bryan, Chairman
McCain, the FTC, and key industry and public interest groups to help pass and implement the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act. . . .”).
154
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claim compliance because they don’t ask for or receive information
by which age can be determined.
The net effect of this corporate reaction to COPPA is that children’s personal information is, for the most part, just as unprotected
and subject to disclosure to corporations as it was before COPPA was
enacted. In short, corporations’ reaction to the law has defined and
set the parameters of COPPA.
Moreover, corporations’ authority in this area is largely unchallenged. Corporations’ reactions to the Act have not been sanctioned
vigilantly by enforcement actions and crippling penalties. Quite to
158
the contrary, outside of a few COPPA enforcement actions brought
by the FTC, the standard and the governing legal regime is that
COPPA is merely a harmless piece of legislation that can be completely ignored by utilizing boilerplate language that claims a lack of
culpability. Indeed, “[w]hether the state actors and corporate actors
are sitting in a room negotiating or dealing through a more informal
dance of reciprocal signaling and expectations, it would seem odd to
159
treat the regulatory result as anything other than a joint product.”
C. Intentional Violation of Privacy Legislation
As noted supra, “corporations may choose to act in ways that
openly and egregiously violate the legislative mandate because gov160
ernmental deterrence is weak and ineffective.”
More specifically,
when penalties for violating legal rules are unsubstantial, corporations are very much incentivized to openly engage in illegal action.
The FTC is charged with enforcement of federal privacy law. Yet
FTC enforcement actions are few and far between, lack effectiveness,
and serve little deterrent effect. Because of this, corporations have
simply chosen to intentionally violate certain privacy statutes because
the benefits of doing so far outweigh the potential downside; in other
words, intentional violation of legislation is beneficial because en161
forcement mechanisms are so weak. These intentional violations of
privacy laws have engendered a society in which privacy protections
are minimal and personal information is aggregated, disseminated,

158
The FTC’s website lists merely eleven enforcement cases under the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act. See Federal Trade Commission, Children’s Privacy,
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/childrens_enf.html (last visited Sept.
11, 2006).
159
Danielsen, supra note 94, at 414.
160
See supra Part II.B.
161
SOLOVE, supra note15, at 72.
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162

and analyzed with impunity. In short, corporations’ intentional violation of governmental law is yet another example of corporate governance of information privacy inasmuch as this behavior has an effect on the marketplace similar to governmental regulation and
inasmuch as this behavior goes largely unchallenged and is accepted
163
as the social norm.
Specifically, this behavior has gone largely unchallenged by either the public or, more significantly, by the FTC. For example, FTC
enforcement actions are sporadic. In the area of credit reporting, for
instance, the FTC’s website lists a mere five enforcement actions since
164
The FTC has been most aggressive in pursuing companies
1998.
for unfair and deceptive trade practices in their privacy practices and
policies; the FTC’s position is “that the use or dissemination of personal information in a manner contrary to a posted privacy policy is a
165
deceptive practice under the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.” A sum total
of eighteen enforcement actions have been brought in this area under the FTC’s enforcement authority under Section Five of the FTC
166
Act.
Furthermore, FTC enforcement actions tend to focus on heavyweight companies that bring in headlines and settlements for the
government. Thus, for example, in its few enforcement actions, the
FTC has gone after companies such as GeoCities, Equifax, Experian,
167
Hershey Foods, Mrs. Field’s, and Quicken Loans.
The totality of
the FTC’s weak enforcement activities reflects an overriding lack of
adequate enforcement mechanisms in the area of individual information privacy. Therefore, the majority of companies who engage in

162
See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other
Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Information for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595 (2004).
163

Regulatory law is particularly susceptible to corporate influence. Writing in the nineteenth century, Karl Marx cautioned that the concentration of wealth in corporate hands would subjugate the law to private
control. Writing in the early 1960s, Chicago-school free market
economists reached the same conclusion, developing what has come to
be called the “capture theory” of regulation.
Ostas, supra note 110, at 269.
164
Federal Trade Commission, Credit Reporting, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/
privacyinitiatives/credit_enf.html (last visited September 3, 2006).
165
SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 24, at 541.
166
See Federal Trade Commission, Unfairness & Deception, http://www.ftc.gov/
privacy/privacyinitiatives/promises_enf.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2006).
167
See generally, Federal Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.gov (last visited Mar. 4,
2006).
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privacy violations suffers no negative consequences and is aware that
there is virtually no chance of being punished.
Finally, FTC privacy enforcement actions generally result in little
168
more than a symbolic penalty.
Rather than engaging in adjudicative proceedings, the FTC generally signs settlement agreements with
companies. Moreover, these settlements represent a mere pittance in
comparison to the corporation’s coffers. For example, in an early
2006 enforcement action that made national headlines, ChoicePoint
was fined fifteen million dollars by the FTC for a leak of private data.
Notably, the fine was lauded as the largest fine ever imposed on a
company by the FTC for violating a privacy law: “[t]he agency declared that the company falsely assured the public about security pre169
The agency arcautions while handling personal data carelessly.”
gued that “the firm sold information to a purported business
customer whose own ChoicePoint file identified a link to possible
170
fraud.” But fifteen million dollars is small change for ChoicePoint;
ChoicePoint currently has a market capitalization of $3.9 billion and
171
annual revenues of approximately $1.1 billion.
Indeed, for
ChoicePoint—a company that specializes in data collection, sharing,
and profiling—the fine is likely seen merely as the cost of doing business.
This toothless enforcement is typical of government enforcement efforts more generally. A 2006 Associated Press examination
revealed that most financial penalties imposed by government agencies remain uncollected:
In many high-profile cases, fines are touted by authorities as proof
that they are cracking down. Yet frequently those orders are quietly negotiated to just a fraction of their original amounts—as if
drivers, faced with fines for speeding, offered the traffic court
172
judge pennies on the dollar, and the judge agreed.

Worse, government agencies regularly issue fines that even they
do not expect to collect. For example, the Department of Energy

168
See Martha Mendoza & Christopher Sullivan, Amount of Unpaid Federal Fines
Soars, THE STATE, Mar. 19, 2006, at A15.
169
Joseph Menn, ChoicePoint Is Fined for Data Breach; It Will Pay $10 Million for
What the FTC Says Was Careless Handling of Consumer Information, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 27, 2006, at C1.
170
Id.
171
ChoicePoint Press Release, ChoicePoint Revenues Exceed $1 Billion in 2005, Jan.
26, 2006, available at http://www.choicepoint.com/choicepoint/news.nsf/
df5fe1c5a497dce38525687e006037f9/2a89e7d31152d32085257101007f8821?OpenD
ocument.
172
Mendoza & Sullivan, supra note 168.
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regularly issues fines—and coinciding press releases—for penalties
173
that they are not even allowed to collect under federal law. The Associated Press’s conclusion:
The reason [the Department of Energy] issued fines it could
not collect was to show what the problems were and how bad . . . .
A $1 million fine says something different than a $10,000 fine.
Financial penalties are regularly touted by agencies and prosecutors as a strict consequence of lawbreaking. The message—that
174
violators can expect to pay dearly—can be misleading.

In another example in the information privacy realm, in a recent
175
action against Gateway Learning Corporation, the FTC charged
that “after collecting consumers’ information, Gateway Learning
changed its privacy policy to allow it to share the information with
176
third parties without notifying consumers or getting their consent.”
The settlement in this case was characteristically toothless: “The proposed settlement bars Gateway Learning from making deceptive
claims about how it will use consumers’ information and from applying material changes in its privacy policy retroactively, without consumers’ consent. It also requires that the company give up $4600 it
177
earned from renting the data.”
This is just one of many examples in which the settlement
amounts are grossly disproportionate to the benefit that the company

173

Federal law exempts the national nuclear laboratories from most financial liability, but the Energy Department has issued some $2.5 million in fines against Los Alamos, Livermore and Argonne national
laboratories since 2000. The fines—issued and waived in the same sentence—involved 31 different workers who inhaled or touched radioactive or toxic materials.
In 2004, Energy’s National Nuclear Safety Department fined Los
Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico $770,000 for five separate
violations after two workers were exposed to dangerously high levels of
plutonium. The violation notices add in parentheses: ”Waived by Statute.”
”This is kind of an exercise in absurdity,” said Greg Mello, who
heads the Los Alamos Study Group. . . .
Even so, the Energy Department includes the fines in its annual reports to Congress and often announces them in press releases.
Id. (emphasis added).
174
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
175
Gateway Learning is the company that markets the “Hooked on Phonics” line
of products. See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Gateway Learning Settles
FTC Privacy Charges, July 7, 2004) available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/
07/gateway.htm.
176
Id.
177
Id. (emphasis added).
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at issue received from its use of consumers’ personal information
and/or to the harm that the consumers at issue suffered. In addition, such small settlement amounts provide no deterrent value. The
paradox here is that the FTC’s enforcement practices result in little
privacy protection for consumers; the “bad acts” of small companies
fall under the radar and, therefore, the vast majority of companies
can do as they please in regard to privacy.
Thus, large corporate offenders who are most likely to attract
the attention of the FTC are not deterred by FTC enforcement actions because even the worst-case scenario—an enforcement action—
does not even amount to a thorn in the side of such large entities.
This reflects a more general pattern in regard to government fines:
The amount of unpaid federal fines has risen sharply in the last
decade. Individuals and corporations regularly avoid large, highly
publicized penalties for wrongdoing—sometimes through negotiations, sometimes because companies go bankrupt, sometimes
due to officials’ failure to keep close track of who owes what un178
der a decentralized collection system.

Moreover, these large corporations are the very entities that
179
drive privacy legislation and governmental policy.
In sum, “[i]t is
. . . clear that the FTC is a paper tiger. A big company with an army
of lawyers knows that it can get away with anything, and any FTC ac180
tion won’t hurt in the end.”
Corporations therefore thwart federal privacy legislation by intentionally violating the laws. This corporate behavior affects the
market in ways similar to a governmental law. In the vacuum of
strong privacy enforcement, corporations shape a regime in which
the federal privacy laws are virtually meaningless, and corporations’
178

Mendoza & Sullivan, supra note 168.
In another enforcement action outside of the privacy realm, the FTC garnered
headlines but little more when it went after Experian for unfair or deceptive trade
practices. The FTC’s charge was that “Experian deceptively marketed free credit reports by not adequately disclosing that consumers would automatically be signed up
for a credit report monitoring service costing $79.95 if they didn’t cancel within 30
days.” Robert Gellman, FTC Falls Short, Again, DM NEWS, Nov. 11, 2005, available at
http://dmnews.com/cgi-bin/artprevbot.cgi?article_id=34715&dest=article.
Experian reportedly had 9 million customers paying $80 a year. That’s
$720 million in revenue. Since some of those customers paid for more
than one year of service and many are continuing customers, the total
revenue probably exceeds $1 billion. . . . What’s the consequence of
violating the law? A fine of less than $1 million, plus refunds. . . .
[L]et’s say that the fine and refunds total $25 million. That is a pittance relative to the revenue.
Id.
180
Gellman, supra note 179.
179
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actions have an effect on the market that resembles the effect of governmental authority. As Paul Schiff Berman has observed, “law is almost never ‘delivered’ on the ground in the pure form that treaties,
legislation, or constitutional court decisions would indicate. Thus, . .
. scholars are in danger of missing how norms actually operate if they
over-emphasize the grand statements made at the highest levels of
181
government.” The actual legal regime is one in which corporations
possess virtually full license to engage in their chosen anti-privacy
practices. Rather than complying with government’s law, corporations view privacy violations as the norm and any (unlikely) penalty
that may result as merely the cost of doing business.
Finally, as in the first two examples, corporations’ private authority vis-à-vis the FTC has been unchallenged in any meaningful way.
Thus, this corporate behavior has become the accepted social norm.
PART IV
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PARADIGM
Actions, reactions, and inactions by all players in the system must be taken
into account to get an accurate picture of the regime itself. Under such circumstances, if the decisions of corporate actors are indistinguishable from
the decisions of state actors in terms of regulatory and social welfare effects,
then treating one as “private activity” and the other as “regulatory” or
“governance” activity will likely lead to more than ideological confusion.
Such counterfactual characterizations may well result in . . . mistakes in
182
policymaking.

This Article began by arguing that information privacy jurisprudence is at an impasse and went on to describe the ossified state of
domestic information privacy law. The Article then proffered that
our information privacy quandaries have not and cannot be solved by
working solely within the current jurisprudential paradigm. In other
words, our paradigm must take account of the reality that information privacy is not just about governmental laws and enforcement, but
is also very much about corporate power and corporate governance.
Problems of information privacy cannot be solved unless their
foundations and root causes are exposed and explored, including
symbiotic governance by corporations and governmental entities. As
Claire Cutler argues, “that which goes unrecognized is difficult to
183
regulate.”

181
182
183

Berman, supra note 105, at 498.
Danielsen, supra note 94, at 415.
Cutler, supra note 1, at 24. Similarly, James Nehf correctly argues that:
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How does such an understanding alter our approaches to information privacy law? How can we utilize this new understanding? I
offer preliminary thoughts that represent but the beginnings of the
possible understanding of the multiple implications of this new paradigm.
A. Beyond Market-Based and Self-Help Solutions
The recognition that corporations govern information privacy
law and policy represents a new paradigm. This paradigm is a shift
from the traditional notion that information privacy law is merely the
province of the government. This new paradigm is also a move away
from the limited notion that solutions must focus on one of two
forces: governmental law or the market. Rather, there is a third,
powerful force that has heretofore gone unrecognized in the literature: governance by corporations. Folding this third force into the
conceptual model of the dynamics of information privacy law and
184
policy mandates a rethinking of possible and practical solutions.
Significantly, this recognition weakens the argument that the
market should provide the proper compass for determining whether
185
information privacy practices are sound.
Market dynamics and in186
dustry self-regulation cannot be relied upon as correct barometers
of public opinion or correct action when the market itself is dominated by the very actors that shape the law and govern the industry
practices.
Arguments for approaching problems of information privacy
with market-based solutions reflect the belief that informational priSince there are benefits and risks associated with information collection and data sharing, policy makers must attempt to strike a balance.
In doing so, they must first define the problem. This is a critical step in
the formulation of public policy because the way in which a problem is
defined on the public agenda will affect its ultimate resolution.
Nehf, supra note 2, at 5.
184
Thus, for example, the importance of focusing on strengthening the lackluster
enforcement efforts of the FTC pales when armed with the knowledge that FTC enforcement is but a piece of the puzzle.
185
“[G]overnment actors insist that self-regulation is the American way, and
[that] it is enough.” Litman, supra note 12, at 1287.
186

Perhaps the most direct corporate influence on legal norms arises in
the area of self-regulation. Advertising law provides an illustration.
The Federal Trade Commission is officially charged with regulating
false advertising, yet most advertising disputes are subject to industry
self-regulation. It is largely left to the industry itself to set its own standards.
Ostas, supra note 110, at 271.
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vacy is merely a personal concern. As James Nehf has observed, information privacy has traditionally been viewed as “an individual concern rather than a general societal value or a public interest prob187
188
Specifically, he argues that
“[t]his [definition of
lem.”
information privacy as an individual concern] has influenced the resulting public policy solutions, yet it may not be the most effective way
189
Thus, solutions have
to approach modern privacy concerns.”
190
“In
tended toward individual, private, and market-based solutions.
contrast, when a problem is viewed as a general societal concern, and
a resolution in the public interest is sought, enforcement of the legal
norm is primarily through government agency oversight and regula191
tion.”
Our understanding of privacy as a private concern rather than a
public concern must shift once we acknowledge that corporate governance is a force which needs to be held in check by the government. In this respect, information privacy can be seen for what it is: a
public value on the most fundamental level. “If no change [in the
political and legal rhetoric] occurs, we can expect to see more laws
enacted periodically that purport to address privacy concerns in particular sectors, but individuals will still be expected to shoulder the
burden of monitoring their own information, and market-based solu192
tions will predominate.”
This view of information privacy as a personal problem rather
than a public one is merely a social understanding that has engendered parallel social norms. Those entities that have a vested interest
in propagating a theory of information privacy as individual and pri-

187

Nehf, supra note 2, at 5.
James Nehf explains the underpinnings of the viewpoint that privacy is an individual issue rather than a larger social issue:
Protecting information privacy threatened defined and influential stakeholders—government agencies, employers, marketing firms, law enforcement—all of whom were just beginning to see the advantages of
information technologies. All had an interest in collecting and sharing
as much information as possible. Each of these stakeholders thus had
incentives to redefine the issue from the ideal of privacy as a foundational societal value to some lesser ideal that required the balancing of
other societal concerns—efficiency, productivity, crime control, etc.—
against the individual harms that might be caused by data collection
and sharing.
Nehf, supra note 2, at 47 (emphasis added).
189
Id. at 5.
190
See id.
191
Id. at 5.
192
Id. at 91.
188

PEEK FINAL.DOC

2006]

10/20/2006 11:32:11 AM

INFORMATION PRIVACY

163

vate rather than public also have an interest in molding this theory
into a widespread social norm.
If information privacy is instead viewed as a public value, and the
symbiotic relationship between public governance and private governance is acknowledged, then practical solutions to problems of information privacy begin to emerge. If government and corporate actors work in symbiotic relationships to form the legal regime under
which we live, then reform efforts must focus on all of the actors that
are the primary power centers shaping the reigning legal regime of
privacy.
In short, understanding that corporations govern the information privacy regime is of profound importance because the privacy of
personal information is not “just another consumer issue,” nor is it
one that ought to be solved by the individual or the market.
B. Corporate Governance and the Fallacy of Choice
Privacy scholars have noted that the concept that consumers
193
have a “choice” about privacy is misguided because if there is any
choice, it is a Hobson’s choice: “an apparently free choice when there
is no real alternative; the necessity of accepting one of two or more
194
This point is even more salient
equally objectionable alternatives.”
once the private governance paradigm is conceded. In regard to per195
sonal “choice” in information privacy:
193
Moreover, on the consumer front, this privacy problem presents the ubiquitous problem of lack of choice. As Julie Cohen argues,
the rhetoric of “choice” obfuscates the political choice that current
data privacy policy represents. The data privacy debate is not merely,
or even mostly, about the satisfaction of consumer preferences as expressed in the direct market for goods and services. Like the rhetoric
of “transaction costs,” the emphasis on “choice” conceals the degree to
which the model predetermines who chooses. In particular, with respect to secondary uses of personally-identified data, the “choice” that
the model protects is not choice by individuals. It is the choice of data
processors about how to classify individuals, and for what purposes.
Cohen, supra note 40, at 1399.
194
M-W.com dictionary definition, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/hobson’s
(last visited September 7, 2006).
195

Consumers are faced with the Hobson’s choice of surrendering their
private information, being unable to participate in large segments of
the commercial economy or to lie.
Now, there are three ways of approaching this problem. First, one
may stridently protest and walk out the door. Second, one may approach the sales clerk and decline to provide the information risking
delay or that the transaction will not occur. Third, one could tell a
white-lie. . . .
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legal consciousness regarding contracts is likely to contain much
of the same multivocality that characterizes legal consciousness on
other kindred topics. When, in order to purchase a needed
product, the consumer must accept the retailer’s standard-form
contract, the symbolism may evoke hierarchy and oppression
more than it evokes mutualism, voluntarism, or equality. Or,
more likely, it may evoke both at once, leaving the consumer with
a Hobson’s choice between a narrative of disempowerment (“I
had no say in the matter”) and a narrative of self-blame (“I
196
brought it on myself”).

In other words, consumers can either consent to a company’s
privacy policy or not do business with that particular company at all;
197
either action represents consumer powerlessness.
In fact, privacy
policies among industries are generally significantly similar—hence,
the realistic “choice” of the consumer is often to consent to a privacy
policy or not do business with an entire industry at all. This Hobson’s
choice, in fact, amounts to coercion. We cannot live in the modern
world and refrain from consenting to the ubiquitous, company-biased
privacy policies and stances. As Paul Schwartz has noted, this is an
198
“autonomy trap.”
True contractual consent requires meaningful choice. For example, there often exists no meaningful choice on the part of the
shopping consumer, as the marketplace is filled with industry leaders
who have a firm stranglehold on the industry and who have adopted
virtually the same pro-business privacy policies. Thus, the American
world of contracts is one in which consent is meaningless and
“agreements” are but a farce. When corporate actors shape the rules
(in confluence with the government) in such a way that the rules not
only heavily favor those corporate actors but also leave consumers
with an extremely limited set of choices, the notion that individuals
truly “consent” to corporate privacy practices becomes farcical.
The phrase “knowledge is power” is almost a truism, as is the
claim that power resides in the hands of those who control the information. But this truism has real meaning in our twenty-first cenLlewellyn Joseph Gibbons, It’s Nobody’s Business, But You Still Cannot Lie About It:
Criminalizing Innocent Attempts to Maintain Cyber-Privacy, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 377, 378
(2004).
196
Mark Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 91, 112 n.27
(2003).
197
Larry Magid, It Pays to Read License Agreements, http://www.pcpitstop.com/
spycheck/eula.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2006) (discussing lack of choice in end-user
license agreements).
198
Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 825
(2000).
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tury society. Understood at its base level, consumers’ “free will” is at
the behest of corporate decision-making. In short, the ceding of our
personal information to corporations has engendered a society that is
controlled by corporations. This realization is of profound significance because we cannot solve the problems of domestic information
privacy unless we address this underlying power dynamic.
Moreover, corporate governance has an effect on social norms.
When corporate governance is part of the legal regime, consumer
199
apathy regarding their lack of information privacy becomes less
surprising. Outside of the problem of identity theft, the vast majority
of consumers seem disinterested in privacy violations. Even more seriously, as discussed supra, many legal scholars treat the problem as
one that merits attention but is obviously less “important” than matters of human rights or environmental law. This phenomenon is not
insignificant. When both laypersons and legal scholars dismiss a social problem as trivial or, at the most, important but less deserving of
attention than “real” social justice issues, that problem becomes relegated to the backwaters of social and legal thought. In turn, the social problem is virtually ignored by policymakers and the government. Yet consumer attitudes are shaped and guided not only by the
government and the mass media, but also by private actors such as
corporations via shared governance of information privacy law.
C. Bringing the Individual Back into Information Privacy
The stripping away of political façade, legitimization, and hidden sources of power is necessary to bring individual citizens’ concerns to the forefront. While it may be true that we are living in a
time of rapid transition from governmental authority to symbiotic
governance both domestically and globally, this does not force the
199

One commentator has observed that:
[C]onsumers are not as concerned about financial privacy as surveys
suggest. A June 2001 study found that many survey questions “distort
or manipulate” the answers. The study went on to note that surveys
“cannot effectively replicate the choices that consumers make in the
real world, where they must choose among competing desires and
where nothing comes for free.” The authors of the survey also point
out that consumers are continuing to shop online in record numbers
despite early forecasts that privacy concerns would keep them away.
The study notes that other surveys show that when people are asked to
name their top concerns without being given a list of possible responses, privacy is not listed as one of their top concerns. The authors
of the study also indicate that consumers may not always report their
actual behavior accurately.
Eric Poggemiller, Note, The Consumer Response to Privacy Provisions in Gramm-LeachBliley: Much Ado About Nothing?, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 617, 633–34 (2002).
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conclusion that individuals must simply accept this fact and consent
to being governed by private actors without democratic accountability.
Rather, the recognition that private governance is occurring in
the field of information privacy is a powerful one that can unlock a
vault of realistic solutions to seemingly intractable problems.
For instance, the understanding that the illusion of “choice” in
privacy negotiations is merely a Hobson’s choice constructed by governing corporations undermines arguments for industry selfregulation and menu-based privacy options between consumers and
corporations. Such “true” contractual arrangements are unlikely to
exist between powerful corporations that govern consumer “privacy”
contracts and relatively powerless consumers.
Similarly, calls for robust privacy legislation appear quixotic
when viewed through the lens of corporate governance of information privacy. This is also true of arguments for more robust and frequent FTC enforcement actions because the state is complicit—
whether through action or inaction—in governance by corporations.
Indeed, “in its manifestation as market authority, private authority
transforms both the state and state sovereignty. However, the state
200
Once we understand and acparticipates in this transformation.”
cept that information privacy is governed not just by our federal,
state, and local governments, but also by corporations, our legal and
policy strategies should be rethought.
Clearly, the “enforcement” model of protecting information privacy is woefully inadequate. The FTC should be understood as
merely a weak enforcement mechanism that ultimately operates in
the interest of corporations. As argued supra, with few exceptions,
even the few FTC settlement actions that are brought to closure do
not involve the individuals whose privacy has been violated, nor do
the individuals share in the spoils of the settlement funds.
201
Individuals must be brought back into the privacy picture.
Looking to the market or to governmental agencies to enforce pri200
Thomas J. Biersteker & Rodney Bruce Hall, Private Authority as Global Governance, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 203, 209
(Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002).
201
One commentator argues that:
the federal courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, have bestowed
the equivalent of human rights on these artificial entities. They now
have the protection of law and the Constitution, which means the protection of the police and the military, to interfere in our elections and
in our lawmaking. . . . They’re able to field fifty or a thousand lobbyists. . . . What’s happened is, we’ve been channeled into regulatory
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vacy rights is a largely futile effort likely to produce few victories. The
privacy problem is fundamentally one wherein the players are corporations and government, and individuals are distant spectators
equipped with foggy, distorting binoculars.
Significantly, this lockout of consumers from their own informa202
tion privacy matters has been accomplished via a steering of such
matters away from the judicial system and into legislative and regulatory backwaters. A pessimist might argue that calls for common law
remedies to privacy wrongs—based in tort, property, and contract
law—are unlikely to succeed when the status quo is governed by the
very entities that have a stake in minimizing our personal information
privacy. But the jurisprudential glass is actually half full. Exposing
the underlying power structures that dictate privacy practices and
leave the individual out of the equation almost entirely might well
cause a rethinking of possible common law solutions.
For example, many privacy wrongs arise out of the farce of privacy policies. Consumers “agree” to what are, in fact, anti-privacy
policies, and are forced to live with that “agreement” because they
consented. Yet once it is understood that there is no true “choice” or
“consent” taking place on the part of the consumer due to corporate
power and governance by corporations, the underutilized defense
that such “agreements” are in fact unconscionable becomes a meaningful possibility. The seminal unconscionability case of Williams v.
203
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. was decided in a context of one retailer
wielding significant power over a neighborhood of consumers with
few options. Yet Williams v. Walker Furniture Co. could serve as the
small-scale model for a more sophisticated case against corporations
and forced privacy agreements on a wide-scale basis. Douglas Baird

administrative agencies, like the Federal Communications Commission,
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Securities Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Board, where we try to make
the best of the worst of a bad situation. . . .
David Barsamian, Challenging Corporate Power: An Interview with Richard Grossman, Z
MAG., Jan. 2000, available at http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Corporations/
ChallengingCorpPower.html.
202
For example, consumers generally receive no part of any FTC monetary settlement. In the few cases in which they have received some redress, it has been paltry
at best and grossly disproportionate to the harm consumers may have suffered because of the privacy violation. As one commentator has noted, “[t]oo often, the
FTC’s principal interest is in being able to pat itself on the back through a trophy
press release. The commission rarely seeks to obtain recovery for consumers.”
Gellman, supra note 179.
203
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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argues that such boilerplate agreements between companies and consumers often reflect a deeper, profound social problem:
When boilerplate appears troublesome, some other mischief is often afoot. Boilerplate, while not a vice itself, is frequently the
symptom of a problem that the law should appropriately address
. . . . [T]roublesome boilerplate can emerge from anticompetitive
behavior. Legal intervention, however, must aim at the underly204
ing anticompetitive conduct itself, not the boilerplate.

Although I do not agree with Baird’s assertion that boilerplate
contracts should not be analyzed under the doctrine of adhesion, but
rather under some underlying “bad actor” conduct, I do agree that
boilerplate “privacy” agreements reflect an underlying power imbalance that is troublesome and should be accounted for when deciding
the legal validity of a contract.
On the property front, some proponents of individuals’ informational privacy have argued that personal information should be
deemed as property of the individual. This argument has, to date,
been unsuccessful. Yet judicial attitudes toward information privacy
might be swayed if the information privacy problem were understood
as one engendered by the power imbalance between corporations
and individuals. In other words, if corporations govern information
privacy and individuals’ personal data is considered to be public, the
question of the role of power and powerlessness in property struggles
comes into play. As K.J. Greene notes:
When we think of private property, we think of three characteristics: the right to exclude others, title (ownership), and the right
to collect income or rent off the property . . . . It has been noted
that: intellectual property law can ameliorate but not eliminate
underlying disparities in bargaining power [and accordingly]
economic need might induce [a person] to part with control over
her [private property], and even give up liberty to use it, perhaps
205
in return for fairly small rewards.

Thus, the dismissal of the “personal information as property” argument is significantly weakened when confronted with the reality of
appropriation of personal property by the dominant entities that
govern the information privacy landscape.
These two examples represent possible means of reviving common law theories by exposing the underlying power structures at
work in information privacy law and enforcement. The notion of
204

Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 934 (2006).
K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 375–76 (1999).
205
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governance by corporations is one that can and should engender a
myriad of imaginative resistance models—whether via the judiciary or
other, less traditional mechanisms.
CONCLUSION
The democratic implications of corporate governance are profound. As one scholar notes:
[A]s firms begin to function like governments, this raises major issues for democratic and representative theories of governance
. . . . [P]rivate entities are not normatively entitled to act authoritatively for the public, because they are not subject to mechanisms
of political accountability, but rather are only subject to the ac206
countability of their private members.

Although an examination of the implications for democracy
posed by corporate governance is beyond the scope of this Article, it
is crucial to begin to raise questions regarding democracy, accountability, and legitimacy in the realm of information privacy. And the
antecedent requirement of such questioning is to expose governance
by corporations in this and other fields, for wrongs that are rooted in
invisible systems of authority cannot be remedied.

206

Biersteker & Hall, supra note 200, at 211.

